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We investigate the persistence of right-wing ideology in Germany. The “Alternative for Ger-
many” (AfD), founded as a party espousing fiscal conservatism, has turned to an openly na-
tionalist and anti-immigrant platform since 2015. We document this rhetorical change with
quantitative text analysis. We further show that municipalities that voted more for the AfD
after 2015 also exhibited higher support for the Nazi party in the 1920s and 30s. The histor-
ical correlation we observe is positive, significant, and large. In our preferred specification,
a one standard deviation increase in historical support for the Nazi party is associated with
a 0.15 standard deviations larger change in votes towards the AfD. Our results are robust to
controlling for a large set of historical and contemporary covariates, especially relating to un-
employment and the recent inflow of refugees from the Middle East.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the persistence of right-wing ideology in Germany. In recent years,
the “Alternative for Germany” (Alternative für Deutschland, henceforth AfD) has offered a political
platform on the far right: conservative, nationalistic, and at times outright xenophobic. We show
that municipalities that, in the 1920s and 30s, expressed strong support for the Nazi party (the
NSDAP) now have a stronger vote base for the AfD. In our baseline specification, a one standard
deviation increase in Nazi support during the Weimar era is associated with 0.15 standard devia-
tions more support for the AfD in recent elections. This result is robust to controlling for state fixed
effects, and for a host of plausible econonomic and social determinants of electoral outcomes.
Crucially, the specific setting of Germany allows us to observe a case in which a change in the
supply of political platforms is key in making a long-run persistence of ideological traits reemerge.
After the catastrophic experience of Nazism and World War II, and the subsequent denazification
process, the postwar legal setting severely constrained the expression of right-wing ideology, and
almost completely impeded the creation of parties on the extreme right fringe. The “Alternative
for Germany” bypassed these constraints: it was founded in 2013 as a platform to promote fiscally
conservative principles and oppose the Greek bailout. Two years later, in 2015, the initial group
of founders (many of them economists) was ousted and the party veered strongly to the right,
focusing on immigration and nationalism (a near-taboo topic in Germany) as main themes. We
find that there is only a small or no correlation between the AfD’s electoral fortunes and Nazi sup-
port in 2013/14, when the AfD espoused merely economic conservatism, whereas the correlation
emerges once the political platform is changed after 2015.
Using quantitative language analysis, we document how the AfD markedly changed its rhetoric
after its sudden change of leadership in 2015. Instead of focusing on Greece and the Euro crisis,
the AfD now emphasized topics such as nationalism, (the perceived threat of) Islam, and immigra-
tion in all media utilized, from political manifestos, to speeches, to Facebook and Twitter posts.
Notably, only the rhetoric changed — the name and the logo of the party remained identical.
This allowed the party to avoid the intense legal scrutiny, and public stigma, that newly-founded
right-wing parties are subject to in Germany. The change in rhetoric after 2015 sufficed as a “dog
whistle” to make the historical correlation with Nazi support reemerge.
A major political turning point in 2015 was the sudden, massive inflow of Syrian refugees in
September and the following months. This occurred soon after the change in leadership at the
AfD’s helm, and undeniably influenced the political discourse. Still, we do not think that this
political event can explain away our findings. First, the AfD’s nationalist turn occurred months
before the inflow of Syrian refugees (actually, at the peak of the Greek bailout crisis), not as a
consequence of it. Second, our empirical strategy rests on a comparison of municipalities and
their change in voting behavior between 2013 (when the AfD was merely fiscally conservative, and
the refugee crisis had not occurred yet) and 2016/17. To the extent that the Syrian refugee crisis
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has increased xenophobia and anti-immigration sentiment in Germany overall, this level effect
should be captured by considering first differences in voting outcomes. Last, we explicitly control
for the presence of refugees in a municipality, and observe that the actual presence of asylum
seekers does not sway voters significantly.
Finally, we consider plausible patterns of voter migration. Our analysis suggests that areas
which traditionally supported the Nazi party witnessed an increase in voter turnout as the AfD
turned more radical; voter mobilization may thus explain parts of the AfD’s electoral success.
Along the intensive margin, our analysis reveals that municipalities with high Nazi vote shares in
the Weimar era moved away from parties on the far left and far right between 2013 and 2016/17,
casting more votes for the AfD instead. (In future work, we plan to complement our analysis of
electoral results with a parallel analysis of political attitudes as expressed in opinion surveys.)
Our analysis speaks to several research agendas in economics and political science. First, we
contribute to the literature on the long-term persistence of cultural traits and attitudes.1 As in
these papers, we show that cultural traits — in our specific case, political attitudes — have deep
origins that may trace back to the distant past, and be transmitted across generations.2 Similar to
the work of Giuliano and Nunn (2017), however, we point out that past experience and attitudes
may not always result in historical persistence.
The AfD’s electoral successes show that the historical persistence of political attitudes is not
always visible, and may need to be “activated” by changes in the institutional setting or the po-
litical marketplace. This activation of historical memories has also been evidenced by two recent
papers. Fisman, Hamao, and Wang (2014) argue that political shocks deteriorating Sino-Japanese
relations — related to the memories of Japanese occupation during WWII — have an impact on
stock market prices of Japanese firms. Fouka and Voth (2016), instead, show how sales of Ger-
man cars declined, as the recent Greek debt crisis worsened, in Greek localities that witnessed
massacres perpetrated by German forces during WWII.
Second, our work is a contribution to understanding the determinants of (radical) right-wing
voting. In recent years, discontent about the social and economic situation has increasingly ex-
pressed itself in votes for candidates and parties on the populist (far) right, from Viktor Orbán
in Hungary to the FPÖ in Austria, from Marine Le Pen in France to the UKIP in Britain, and to
1. The recent literature in economics on deep roots and persistence of cultural values is large; a very incomplete set of
references would include Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), Jha (2013), Spolaore and
Wacziarg (2013), Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013), Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2016), Becker et al. (2016), Becker
and Pascali (2016). Cultural values persist even when the economic logic that plausibly gave rise to them in the past, in
a certain historical and social setting, subsides, or when people migrate into a different country: Voigtländer and Voth
(2012) show that antisemitism persisted in German cities even after Jews were completely evicted through pogroms;
a large literature, using the “epidemiological approach”, has shown how second-generation immigrants often mimic
the cultural traits and attitudes of their ancestors’ country of origin (Giuliano, 2007; Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Alesina
and Giuliano, 2010; Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Luttmer and Singhal, 2011).
2. Complementary to our context, an important literature in political science has studied the intergenerational trans-
mission of political preferences, see e.g. Beck and Jennings (1991) and Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers (2009). Specifically
for the context of right-wing ideology, see Avdeenko and Siedler (2017).
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Donald Trump. Economic insecurity, spurred by increasing globalization and the demise of tra-
ditional manufacturing, may explain part of this political shift.3 Increasing levels of immigrant
population in (Western European) countries may also explain some part of the right’s electoral
successes.4 However, closer to the setting studied in our analysis, Steinmayr (2017) finds that the
short-term effects of direct exposure to Syrian refugees are more favorable to parties supporting
immigration, rather than to xenophobic movements. Finally, Inglehart and Norris (2016) argue
that the recent rise of populism can best be understood as a reactionary response to a cultural
change that is perceived as too fast and unsettling by some sectors of the population.
This latter research is part of a longer tradition of political scientists trying to understand the
emergence of far right parties, especially in a comparative dimension.5 To our knowledge, we are
among the first to bring two new factors, and the interaction thereof, to the explanation of the elec-
toral successes of right-wing parties. On the one hand, we shed light on the role of long-standing,
deeply ingrained political beliefs — this is especially salient in Germany, a country that experi-
enced a most destructive instance of fascism.6 On the other hand, we emphasize the importance
of political structures, and the incentives/constraints they set for the formation of political parties,
in facilitating the expression of right-wing ideology.7
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we provide an introduction to the political context
in Germany, and some information about the history of the AfD. In section 3, we describe the
data used. In section 4, we use language analysis to quantify the change in the AfD’s rhetoric
after March 2015. In section 5, we present the empirical analysis linking historical support for the
NSDAP with the AfD’s electoral results. Finally, in section 6 we conclude.
2 Historical Context
2.1 The Political Landscape in Germany
After the collapse of the Nazi regime and Germany’s defeat in World War II, the reconstruction of
the political party system in West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany, founded in 1949)
faced two major challenges. First, parties tried to rebuild a system that would supersede the
3. This important dynamic has recently been studied for the US (Autor et al., 2016), for Germany (Dippel, Gold, and
Heblich, 2016), and for France (Malgouyres, 2017).
4. Halla, Wagner, and Zweimüller (2016) and Dustmann, Vasiljeva, and Piil Damm (2016).
5. See, e.g., the recent review by Golder (2016), as well as the earlier works by Norris (2005), Mudde (2007), and
Arzheimer (2008).
6. Despite the availability of high-quality electoral data from the Weimar era, only few researchers have tried to
correlate post-war political outcomes in the Federal Republic of Germany with early Nazi support: Liepelt (1967)
showed that in 1966 there was a strong correlation between electoral successes of the NPD (a neo-Nazi party) and the
NSDAP in 1932. Cf. also the early contributions by Kaltefleiter (1966), Kühnl, Rilling, and Sager (1969), Sahner (1972),
and Winkler (1994).
7. Closer to our argument, Arzheimer and Carter (2006) emphasize the importance of structural factors that shape the
political opportunity structure and thus the comparative emergence of right-wing movements, as well as the interaction
of economic factors and political structures (Arzheimer, 2009).
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structural weaknesses of parties during the Weimar era — a weakness that arguably resulted in
the end of democracy and the Nazi’s takeover of power. Second, parties struggled to integrate
large swaths of the population who were actively involved in the Nazi dictatorship, among those
an estimated 8.5 million former card-carrying NSDAP party members, into the new democratic
system.
On the right side of the political spectrum, the main actor was the Christian Democratic Union
(CDU). Founded by several members of the Nazi resistance, it built on the previous experience of
the Catholic “Zentrum” party, but explicitly tried to appeal also to Protestant voters, who before
the war largely supported nationalist/conservative parties. The CDU (and its Bavarian sister
party, the CSU) succeeded in the endeavor of becoming the main conservative party in Germany,
channelling nationalists, economic liberals, and social conservatives alike into one party strongly
supporting democratic values in the new Federal Republic of Germany. Smaller parties on the
right appealing to specific constituencies, such as the BHE (League of Expellees), targeting the
expellees losing their ancestral homelands after WWII, and the DP (German Party), appealing
especially to war veterans and northern German conservatives, quickly disappeared and were not
represented in the federal parliament any more after 1957.
Other political parties emerging to the right of the CDU/CSU in later years were similarly
unsuccessful, scoring at best very temporary successes. The NPD (National Democratic Party) was
founded in 1964 and enjoyed some temporary popularity in the late 1960, winning some seats in
state assemblies. However, it never managed to break through the 5% threshold of votes required
to gain representation in the Bundestag (the federal parliament). In the following decades, it drifted
further to the right and lost electoral support, only to regain popularity after Reunification in the
states of former East Germany. There, it entered two state assemblies (in Mecklenburg and in
Saxony) twice in the late 2000s, securing up to 9.2% of the votes. At the federal level, the NPD
remained insignificant, never scoring more than 1.6% of the vote after 1990.
Among other attempts of party to break through on the right side of the CDU/CSU, the Repub-
likaner (Republicans) were notable due to their successes in the late 1980s and early 1990s. They
entered two state assemblies, sent MPs to the European Parliament in 1989, but they, too, repeat-
edly failed to pass the 5% threshold to enter the Bundestag and drifted into irrelevance. The ability
of the CDU/CSU to squeeze out all margins on the right end of the political spectrum, all the
while remaining solidly grounded in democratic and liberal principles, is well summarized by the
long-time leader of the CSU, Franz Josef Strauss, who quipped in 1986 that there “shall not be a
democratically legitimate party to the right of the CSU.”
Indeed, no explicitly nationalistic/right-wing party was ever able to enjoy substantial and
continued electoral success in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany. However, this was
not only due to the CDU/CSU’s ability to occupy the space on the political right: a major factor
was also a provision in the Basic Law (the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany) that
enabled the Constitutional Court to disband extremist parties on the left and the right. Article 21.2
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of the Basic Law states that “[p]arties that, by reason of their aims or the behaviour of their adherents, seek
to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic
of Germany shall be unconstitutional.” This article was invoked twice with success: in 1952, the
Constitutional Court outlawed the SRP (Sozialistische Reichspartei, Socialist Reich Party), a party
that had an openly neo-Fascist agenda and recruited former Nazi functionaries, and in 1956 the
communist party (KPD).
This provision in the Basic Law was successful in disciplining the extremeness of right-wing
political platform even when it did not result in an explicit party ban — the mere threat of dis-
bandment sufficed. The case of the NPD was twice brought to the Constitutional Court, once in
the early 2000s, when it was dismissed on formal grounds, and once in 2016-17, when the court
ruled that, while the party’s ideology is unconstitutional, its support is to small to undermine the
democratic order and thus to justify its ban.
2.2 The “Alternative for Germany” (AfD)
In September 2012 three individuals — Bernd Lucke (an economics professor from Hamburg), a
former CDU politician and a journalist — signed an appeal to oppose the current policies pursued
by the German government to fight the Euro crisis. The manifesto called for the foundation of a
party to be called “Electoral Alternative 2013”. Notably, this initial manifesto was only concerned
with the Euro crisis, the potential bailout of Southern European states, and the fear that the federal
government might cede more powers to Brussels (also suggesting the use of referenda) — the
manifesto explicitly excluded that the “alternative” should take a stance on other policy concerns.
In the following months, the “Electoral Alternative” morphed into a fully-fledged party, at-
tracting, in particular, a large number of disappointed former CDU and FDP members, as well as
several economics professors. In the 2013 federal election, the “Alternative for Germany” (Alterna-
tive für Deutschland, or AfD), as it was now named, won 4.7% of the votes, only narrowly missing
the 5% threshold to enter the Bundestag.
Following the federal election, the AfD gained further strength, obtaining 7.1% of the votes
in the European Parliament election of May 2014. This expansion, however, also meant that new
party members were not only concerned about Euro crisis policies; in fact, the AfD increasingly at-
tracted conservatives of all sorts, who did not feel represented by the centrist course of chancellor
Angela Merkel. The tensions between the initial group of party members — economics professors
and fiscal conservatives — and the newer, national-conservative, anti-immigration members be-
came virulent in the spring of 2015, when two leading party functionaries from Eastern Germany
published the “Erfurt Resolution.”
In this document, they called for a policy of opposition to the “social experiments of the past
decades (gender mainstreaming, multiculturalism) [. . . ]” and encouraged the party leadership to
embrace the xenophobic, anti-immigrant PEGIDA (“Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization
of the West”) movement. At the following party congress in Essen, in July 2015, Frauke Petry, rep-
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resenting the conservative, anti-immigrant part wing was surprisingly elected party leader with
60% of the vote, against 38% of the votes going to the party founder Bernd Lucke. The congress
in Essen sanctioned the takeover of the party by its conservative faction; the fiscal conservatives
rallying around Bernd Lucke left the party and founded another movement (with little electoral
fortune so far).
With its new, anti-immigrant conservative rhetoric, the AfD sailed to considerable successes in
the subsequent state elections held in 2016 in the states of Baden-Württemberg (15.1%), Rhineland-
Palatinate (12.6%), Saxony-Anhalt (24.3%), Mecklenburg-Anterior Pomerania (20.8%), and Berlin
(14.2%). The sudden, large expansion of the party, and the election of inexperienced and insuf-
ficiently vetted candidates to local assemblies also meant that the AfD was involved in several
political scandals, especially with regard to extremist political views (antisemitism, holocaust de-
nial). The party leadership also moved further to the right, booting out Frauke Petry in the 2017
national congress and replacing her with even more conservative members.
Perhaps as a consequence of this further radicalization, the party’s performance in local elec-
tions in 2017 was less impressive; still, it gained representation in all state assemblies that were
up for election in that year (Saarland, 6.2%, Schleswig-Holstein, 5.9%, North Rhine-Westphalia,
7.4%). As we write, the AfD prepares for a federal election (scheduled in September 2017) with
a program that espouses staunchly conservative values (law and order, traditional family valies),
but also less established views (climate change denial, skepticism of mainstream media) and bor-
dering outright xenophobia (calling for a stop to immigration, especially of asylum seekers and
family recompositions, limiting access of immigrants to social security, and demanding German
values rather than a multicultural society).8 Figure 1 reports a timeline of the major events.
3 Data Description
Our body of data used in this research consists of three parts: (i) electoral data; (ii) data document-
ing the relative shift in political platforms, as reflected by political language; and (iii) other control
variables.
3.1 Electoral Data
Our electoral data are drawn from the official websites of the Federal Returning Officer (Bun-
deswahlleiter), for the federal election to the Bundestag of September 2013, or from the respective
state returning officers (Landeswahlleiter), for the election to state parliaments (Landtage) in 2016
and 2017. The data are provided at the municipality (Gemeinde) level.
8. See “Programm für die Wahl zum Deutschen Bundestag am 24. September 2017”, https://www.afd.de/
wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2017/06/2017-06-01_AfD-Bundestagswahlprogramm_Onlinefassung.pdf, last ac-
cessed 14 August 2017. Hensel et al. (2017) provide a comprehensive overview of the AfD’s history and current goals.
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Data for the federal (Bundestag) elections prior to 2013 are obtained from DESTATIS, the German
federal statistical office. We purchased the municipality-level tabulations of all elections from 1989
until 2009 (data for the elections in 1980, 1983, and 1987 refer to West Germany only).
For the electoral results of right-wing parties during the Weimar Republic, we resort to the
pathbreaking work of Jürgen Falter and Dirk Hänisch (Falter and Hänisch, 1990), who digitized
the votes for the Reichstag elections from 1920 until 1933 as published in the series Statistik des
Deutschen Reiches. In all years, except for the two elections of 1932 (July and November), electoral
results were published at the level of counties as a whole (Kreis or Stadtkreis), and then separately
for all municipalities above 2,000 inhabitants contained in a county.9 From this disaggregation, we
can easily reconstruct the aggregate votes for all municipalities contained in a county, but below
the 2,000 inhabitants threshold (the “remainder of the county”).
We match present-day electoral outcomes to the Weimar era party support through a geocod-
ing algorithm, in two steps: in the first step, we geocode the Weimar-era electoral entities (counties
and municipalities) listed in the Falter and Hänisch (1990) dataset, using a combination of histori-
cal county shape files,10 current geodata in OpenStreetMaps, and a variety of other online sources.
In the second step, we match modern electoral geographies to these geocoded entities. Based on
the geographic location, a current municipality is either matched to a city-county (Stadtkreis) of the
Weimar era, or to one of the municipalities whose electoral data are known because it had more
than 2,000 inhabitants. We call these municipalities “exact matches”. The remaining municipali-
ties are then assigned, based on their location, to the entity “remainder of the county”, i.e. to the
aggregate electoral results in a historical county, outside the municipalities with more than 2,000
inhabitants. Typically, for any Weimar-era observation relating to the “remainder of the county”,
there will be several present-day municipalities matched. We therefore account for this by cluster-
ing our regression analysis at the level of observation in the Weimar era (Stadtkreis, municipality
above 2,000 inhabitants, or “remainder of the county”).11
3.2 Text Data
We analyze the language used by the AfD and other major German parties by considering a vari-
ety of sources. Besides the AfD, we consider the following parties: CDU/CSU12 (christian demo-
cratic, moderately conservative), SPD (social democratic, moderately left-wing), Grüne (green
party), FDP (free democrats, economic/socially liberal), NPD (nationalistic, starkly right-wing,
only represented in a few state legislatures).
9. For the elections of 1932, no data at a level of disaggregation below the county were published. After 1933, the
new regime unfortunately had priorities other than publishing past electoral results. We therefore cannot use the 1932
electoral results in our analysis.
10. Provided through the Census Mosaic project, http://www.censusmosaic.org.
11. Supplementary Appendix A.1 describes this algorithm in detail.
12. For speeches and party manifestos, we consider the CDU and the CSU as one party (among other reasons, be-
cause of the low number of observations). For tweets and facebook posts, we look at the CDU and the CSU accounts
separately.
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First, we look at all party manifestos explaining the respective party’s political platform in ad-
vance of major elections (federal, state, and European Parliament elections). These manifestos are
usually published a few months ahead of the election, and contain variously detailed statements
of political objectives and policy proposals. We obtained the full text (pdf) of 74 manifestos from
the respective party websites; the median manifesto is 56 pages long and encompasses approxi-
mately 19,500 words. In the appendix, Table B.1 provides an overview of the manifestos used.
Second, we consider major political speeches held at party congresses or so-called “Ash Wednes-
day” speeches13 by major political leaders (usually the party secretaries or the main candidates).
We select these speeches as follows: We limit the search to party congresses, Ash Wednesday
meetings, or other national-level party meetings (e.g., the traditional Epiphany meeting of the
FDP on 6 January), and we only consider speeches by major party leaders. If the speeches are
not available in a transcribed version, we resort to online videos of these speeches and transcribe
them with speech recognition software or manually. Our final dataset contains 112 speeches; the
median length of a speech is 27 minutes.
Third, we analyze tweets posted from the official Twitter accounts of those six major parties
(we restrict ourselves to the main/national account of the party, not of its regional branches and
candidates). We scrape all tweets from April 2008 (when the Greens party opened a twitter ac-
count) until the end of June 2017, obtaining a total of 66,422 tweets (the most prolific party is the
NPD, with 18,057 tweets, followed by the SPD, with 10,580 tweets; the AFD posted 4,119 tweets).
Finally, we also scrape facebook posts from the official Facebook pages of the major parties
(again restricting ourselves to the federal-level party organization, not to its local branches). We
obtain 36,089 posts from November 2008 until May 2017; 12,794 of these posts pertain to the NPD
page, 2,881 to the AFD.
3.3 Other Variables
We complement our analysis of electoral results with a range of both historical and contempo-
rary control variables — variables that may be potentially omitted factors in our regression se-
tups. For the Weimar era, we resort to the same dataset by Falter and Hänisch (1990), which also
contains statistics on, among others, population, unemployment, employment structure, and reli-
gious composition in 1925 and 1933. Population and religion data are available at the municipal
level (municipalities above 2,000 inhabitants); all other statistics are only available at the county
level. We match those statistics to contemporary voting outcomes using the same algorithm as for
electoral data.
We also include a variety of contemporary control variables in our electoral data regressions.
These comprise the unemployment rate, total population, male population share, and area of the
13. On Ash Wednesday, all major political parties in Germany hold speeches, often in beer halls, which are typically
more polemical and more directly targeted against opponents.
8
municipality (all measured in 2013) in our regressions, as well as a full set of dummies character-
izing the degree of urbanization of a municipality.14 These data are obtained from DESTATIS.
Note, however, that our preferred specification focuses on the change in electoral support for
the AfD between 2013 and the following state election (in 2016 or 2017). Therefore, one should
be particularly interested in the potentially confounding effect of other changes occurring in the
same time frame. For example, we obtained data on the change in unemployment, at the munic-
ipal level, between 2013 and 2016 (from DESTATIS). The most salient political event happening in
this time frame is the “(Syrian) refugee crisis”, which peaked in the fall of 2015 after Germany’s
decision to suspend the Dublin agreement and not to deport asylum seekers back to the first EU
member state they entered. While most asylum seekers enter Germany through the German-
Austrian border in the southeast of the country, they are supposed to be reallocated to the single
federal states, and then again to counties, according to a quota system which takes into account
population and GDP. Within counties, asylum seekers are further assigned to municipalities ac-
cording to a variety of criteria. From the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit),
we obtain the number of asylum seekers in each municipality, as of December 31, 2016.15 Given
the low number of refugees in 2013, we consider the level of asylum seeker in December 2016 as a
close approximation to the change relative to 2013.
4 Evidence on Semantic Change
We view the turn of the AfD from a monothematic, anti-Euro and anti-Greek bailout party to a
more traditional xenophobic, anti-immigrant right-wing party as a suitable policy experiment in
which an existing party changes its placement on the political spectrum, without changing the
name, logo, or most of the party structures.16 Clearly, this change was also perceived by the
voters. In the surveys conducted for the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), potential
voters were asked to place parties on an 11-point left-right scale.17 As shown in Figure 2, in 2013
voters were not sure where to place the AfD on a left-right spectrum; the modal answer (excluding
“I don’t know”, which is by far the preferred response) is the score of 6, right in the middle of the
spectrum, and the median is 7, just to the right of the center. Over the course of the following
years, the public perception of the party shifted radically, especially after 2015. In 2016, only few
voters cannot place the AfD on a left-right spectrum, and most place the party to the far right (the
14. Following EUROSTAT guidelines, DESTATIS classifies municipalities according to its urbanization density as fol-
lows: “densely populated” if at least 50% of the population lives in high-density clusters, “thinly populated” if more
than 50% of the population lives in rural grid cells, and “intermediate density” (all other municipalities).
15. To be precise, the data from the Federal Employment Agency refer to Erwerbsfähige Leistungsberechtigte im Kontext
von Fluchtmigration, i.e. potential transfer recipients, able to work, in the context of escape migration. This includes,
roughly, all asylum applicants who are above age 15, not disabled, excluding family members who joint first emigrants
at a later stage. The exact number of asylum applicants cannot be obtained at the municipality level.
16. Figures B.1 and B.2 in the Appendix show, anecdotally, how this change was reflected in party billboards.
17. We use component 8 of the GLES (Long-term online tracking), studies ZA5720, ZA5726, ZA5728, ZA5732. All
studies are available through the GESIS website (www.gesis.org).
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rightmost answer, 11, is also the modal answer).
We back up this survey evidence with text data. To do this, we analyze the language used by
the AfD and by other major German parties on different channels: in party manifestos, in major
speeches, in Facebook posts (on the official Facebook pages), and in tweets (on the official Twitter
accounts of the respective parties). Figure 3 gives a first quantitative impression of the nationalistic
turn imparted on the AfD starting in mid-2015.
We classify Facebook posts (looking at trimmed word stems) depending on whether they con-
tain a word that is related to the Euro, to Greece (likely in the context of the bailout talks), to
Islam/Muslims, or to Germany/the nation. Up until 2015, about 20% of posts refer, on average,
to the Euro, and approximately the same amount refers to Germany/the nation. There is, how-
ever, already a slight downward trend in references to the Euro before 2015, which suggests that,
as the base expanded, the party’s outlook widened beyond its initial narrow focus on economic
topics. 2015 witnesses two major changes. First, as the Greek crisis approached a new zenith (the
infamous “bailout” referendum was held on July 5), Greece and the Euro reach a short-lived peak
in frequencies. At the same time, after the party congress in Essen, the AfD turns rightward: posts
referring to Germany or the nation steadily increase in frequency, and so do posts referring to Is-
lam or the Muslim world. Note that the latter change only occurs in mid-2016, well after the peak
of the refugee crisis in September 2015.
However, these suggestive trends may also be misleading, and merely capture an overall
change in topics relevant for German politics. It is plausible that other parties in Germany, in
the context of the dramatic political and economic crises of the past years, have readjusted their
rhetoric and the focus of their policy proposals. For this purpose, in Table 1 we look at the overall
text body that we collected in manifestos, speeches, tweets and Facebook posts, for seven major
parties in Germany: the AfD, as well as the CDU/CSU, SPD, Greens, FDP, Linke, and (as a bench-
mark of a more radical, right-wing party) the ultranationalist NPD. With this body of data we can
estimate a full differences-in-differences specification as follows:
f (stem = s)ipt = γp + δt + β · 1{party = AfD} · Postt + ε ipt, (1)
where the dependent variable f (stem = s) is the frequency (mention per 100 words) of stem s
in document i (party manifesto, speech), of party p at time t. For shorter pieces of text (tweets,
Facebook post), we use the following variant specification:
1{(stem = s) ∈ i}ipt = γp + δt + β · 1{party = AfD} · Postt + ε ipt, (2)
where 1{(stem = s) ∈ i} is a dummy indicating whether stem s is contained in document i
(tweet, post) of party p at time t. In all specifications, we include a is a full set of party fixed effects
(γp) and of time fixed effects (δt): these are year fixed effects for speeches and manifestos, and
month×year fixed effects for tweets and Facebook posts. Postt is a dummy for all periods after
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the Erfurt Resolution (March 2015). Standard errors ε ipt are clustered at the party×year cell level
(for manifestos ans speeches) or at the party×year×month level (for tweets and Facebook posts).
The crucial difference-in-differences parameter of interest is β, indicating the increase in fre-
quency (or mentions) of a given stem in documents of the AfD, after the Erfurt Resolution, condi-
tional on state and time fixed effects. Table 1 reports the estimates of β across four media (man-
ifestos, speeches, tweets, and Facebook posts, in Panels A through D, respectively), and for five
outcome stems of interest: Greece, the Euro, Islam, migration, and nation.18 Every cell in that
table reports the estimate of the difference-in-differences parameter for one regression, defined by
a dyad of medium and stem.
Across all text media, we see consistent results. Even when viewed in relation to the language
used by the other political parties in Germany, the AfD notably reduces the mentions of Greece
and the Euro in its rhetoric, and increases the usage of words related to Islam, to migration, and
to Germany/the nation. For example, the estimate in panel B, column 2, suggests that after 2015,
the reduction of mentions of stems relating to the Euro in speeches by AfD members is 0.546 per
100 words (significant at <1% level). This compares to a mean of the dependent variable of 0.703
(for AfD speeches, before 2015); it is thus a very sizable decrease.19
By converse, the estimate in panel D, column 4, suggests that after March 2015, the share of
Facebook posts mentioning a stem related to the migration context increases by 11.2 percentage
points (significant at <1% level). Again, this is sizable if compared to a pre-March 2015 mean of
the outcome variable of 5.8 percent (for the AfD).
Arguably, the five word stems shown in Table 1 have been arbitrarily chosen, based on our
priors regarding which words should witness the starkest changes following the rightward turn
imparted on the AfD after the Erfurt Resolution. To avoid our subjective bias, and to validate the
stems chosen in Table 1, in Figure 4 we follow a different approach. Here, we repeat the stan-
dard differences-in-differences estimations of equation (1) above, applying this regression setup
to the 645 most frequent word stems that we identified in our entire body of Facebook posts.20
Figure 4 presents the distribution of the β coefficients estimated from equation (1), across 645
stems. First, it is noticeable that the distribution of point estimates is skewed to the right of zero:
this indicates that the language used by the AfD, after March 2015, becomes more varied. Sec-
ond, vertical dashed lines in the figure show the positioning of the point estimates relating to key
words used so far. Confirming the results of Table 1, we see that “Euro” and “Greece” are to the
18. More precisely, the stem “Greece” encompasses all German words including *griech*; “Euro” all words that start
with euro*, but not europ*, and also the acronym EZB (European Central Bank, in German); the stem “Islam” all words
including *islam* and *muslim*; the stem “migration” all words including *migration*, *wander*, *flüchtling*, and *asyl*;
the stem “nation” all words including *nation* and *deutsch*. Appendix Table B.3 reports the 10 most frequent words
identified by this algorithm for each stem.
19. Table B.2 in the Appendix provides (conditional) means for all dependent variables.
20. To be more precise, we consider the universe of words in the body of Facebook posts we collected. We remove
numbers, punctuation, and stopwords, and then stem the resulting words using the tm package for R. We keep all
stems that are used at least 200 times. This results in 645 word stems.
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left of zero, whereas the usage of words such as “Islam”, “asylum”, and especially “Germany”
increases dramatically for the AfD after March 2015, relative to other parties. Third, it is also no-
ticeable that a traditional mainstay of conservative political ideology, the “family”, does not move
into the focus of the AfD’s rhetoric: the point estimate is very close to zero. We see this as sugges-
tive of the fact that the post-March 2015 turn experienced by the AfD was explicitly nationalistic
and xenophobic (anti-Muslim), not merely conservative.
5 Electoral Results
5.1 Empirical Setup
How did the rightward turn in the AfD’s rhetoric and policy platform change its electoral for-
tunes? We compare electoral results for the AfD before and after 2015 — 2015 marks a watershed,
as thanks to the Erfurt Resolution and the subsequent party congress in Essen, the initial (fiscally
conservative) party leaders were replaced by a new, nationalistic and xenophobic leadership (cf.
the timeline of events in Figure 1). Specifically, we compare the results in the federal election in
September 2013 to local elections to state assemblies that occurred after 2015.
In 2013, running on a strict anti-Euro platform, the AfD barely missed passing the 5% thresh-
old to enter the federal parliament; in the period after 2015, state elections occurred in the states
of Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Anterior Pomerania
(all in 2016), North Rhine-Westphalia, and Schleswig-Holstein (in 2017). In all of those cases, the
AfD passed the 5% threshold (often reaching double-digit results) and gained seats in the state
assemblies. Figure 5 provides a map of the states used in our analysis.21
Our baseline regression specification is as follows:
ShareAfDit = θs + β · ShareNazii + x1i ′γ + ε it, (3)
where ShareAfDit is the share of votes cast for the AfD in municipality i in year t (where t may
either refer to the federal election of 2013, or a state election in 2016/17). Note that, in our baseline
setting, we calculate the share of votes relative to all eligible voters, not just relative to votes cast.
We do this in order to incorporate two margins of voter mobilization towards the AfD: switching
from non-voting to the AfD, or from other parties to the AfD. In a later step we will disentangle
the intensive and the extensive margins of voting.
21. Note that we ignore the elections in Berlin in 2016 (as there is only one municipality in the state of Berlin) and in the
Saarland in 2017 (as the Saar region did not vote for the Reichstag in the Weimar era, being under French occupation).
Arguably, people’s objectives and motives to vote in a state election may differ from a federal election, potentially
confounding a comparison of voting patterns. However, to the extent that this divergence in voting behavior affects
all states in the same manner, it should not invalidate the inference we draw. In future work, we plan to analyze the
electoral results of the upcoming federal election of 2017, thereby comparing two elections to the same legislative body,
the Bundestag (2017 and 2013).
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The dependent variable is regressed on a full set of state fixed effects, θs, a measure of support
for the NSDAP party during the Weimar era, ShareNazii, and potentially also a set of (mostly
time-invariant) municipal level covariates, x1i, such as population or unemployment rates.
To take care of municipal-level, time-invariant omitted factors that may determine a constant
inclination to vote for the AfD, the following, alternative specification takes advantage of the fact
that each municipality is observed twice, once before and once after 2015, and focuses on the
change in vote share from 2013 to 2016/17:
∆(ShareAfDi,2016/17−2013) = θs + β · ShareNazii + x2i ′γ + ε it (4)
Note that, unless one assumes that time-invariant municipality characteristics have time-varying
effects on the outcome variables (varying between 2013 and 2016/17), the effect of these variables
will be “differenced out” in such a first-differences specification. However, one may still allow for
time-varying effects of covariates, or investigate changes in municipal-level covariates occurring
between 2013 and 2016/17. For these reasons, we may also include a vector of covariates x2i,
potentially different from the covariates included in equation (3).
Of the 5,475 municipalities in the six states considered, 1,191 are “exactly matched”: that is,
they are either matched to a Stadtkreis (city-county) of the Weimar era (84 cases), or to a munici-
pality contained in a larger county, but which had more than 2,000 inhabitants in the Weimar era
(1,107 cases), thus with exact electoral returns in the 1920s and 30s. The remaining 4,284 munic-
ipalities are assigned one of 259 Weimar-era “remainders of a county”. To account for potential
correlation between these multiple observations assigned to a single historical electoral result, we
cluster all error terms ε it at the Weimar-era unit of observation (Stadtkreis, municipality above 2,000
inhabitants, or “remainder of the county”).
5.2 Baseline Results
Table 2 reports our baseline estimates. To facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients, all vari-
ables, dependent and explanatory, are standardized. The four columns represent four possible,
alternative explanatory variables: the NSDAP vote share in 1928, 1930, and 1933 in columns 2–4,
respectively,22 and an aggregate z-score index (also standardized) of these three elections in col-
umn 1. The regressions in Panel A feature the AfD’s vote share in the federal election of 2013 as
the dependent variable. Across all columns (all explanatory variables), one can see that there is
a positive, but generally small and insignificant correlation between Nazi vote in the Weimar era
and AfD support.
However, when one looks at support for the AfD in the state elections occurring in 2016/17,
after the Erfurt resolution, the results are very different. As one can see in Panel B, the correlation
22. In 1924, the NSDAP did not present a separate list for the Reichstag election, but supported the Deutschvlkische
Freiheitspartei (DVFP). The electoral results of 1932 were not published at the disaggregate level.
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between past Nazi support and contemporary AfD support, in elections in which the AfD repre-
sented a far right, xenophobic platform, is strong and significant. In our preferred specification
of column 1, a one standard deviation increase in NSDAP votes in the Weimar era corresponds
to a 0.16 standard deviations higher vote share for the AfD. Notably, the results are very similar
no matter whether one uses an early indicator of Nazi support, such as votes in 1928 (when the
NSDAP was still a fringe party, obtaining only 2.6 percent of the votes at the national level), or a
late indicator, such as the last, semi-free election of March 1933, when the NSDAP obtained 43.9
percent of the votes.
Finally, the results in Panel C correspond to the regression setup in equation (4). Here, by
looking at changes in vote shares, we take into account municipality-specific unobservables that
may determine a municipality’s inclination to vote for a right-wing alternative to the established
parties such as the CDU, no matter whether the party is mostly fiscally conservative (as the AfD
in 2013), or mostly nationalistic and anti-immigrant (as the AfD in 2016/17). The resulting picture
is very similar to Panel B. The standardized beta coefficient on the association between Nazi vote
and the shift to the AfD, following its 2015 turn, is about 0.15. The estimated coefficient is siz-
able compared to other, plausible determinants of far right electoral outcomes: for example, trade
exposure is associated with votes for the far right in France with a beta coefficient of 0.07 (Mal-
gouyres, 2017), or with a beta coefficient of 0.28 in Germany (Dippel, Gold, and Heblich, 2016).
Figure 6 provides a visual impression (as a binned scatterplot) of the relationship estimated.
The seminal work by Voigtländer and Voth (2012, 2015) has shown how antisemitism is a
persistent feature of certain regions in Germany. In Table 3 we argue, however, that antisemitism
is not what explains the success of the AfD in more recent years. Columns 1 and 2 analyze how
the AfD’s electoral results are correlated with the electoral success of two parties standing for
the Reichstag election of 1924: the Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DNVP) and the Deutschvölkische
Freiheitspartei (DVFP). The DNVP was the main conservative party of the Weimar era, before the
emergence of the NSDAP: nationalist, reactionary, monarchist. The DVFP was split off the DNVP,
as some of its members thought it should be more explicitly antisemitic. The 1924 election thus
pitted two far right parties against each other: a merely staunchly conservative one (the DNVP),
and a clearly antisemitic one (the DVFP). As the results in Table 3 show, the electoral success of the
AfD is highly correlated with the conservative party in the Weimar era, but not with its antisemitic
spin-off.
Columns 3–5 of Table 3 confirm these results. Here, we limit the analysis to the 423 cities that
are both featured in our dataset, and in the work by Voigtländer and Voth (2012). In column 3, we
first confirm that our baseline estimate of Table 2 can be replicated, with broadly similar results
within those 423 cities. In column 4 we then regress the AfD’s electoral fortunes on the composite
measure created by Voigtländer and Voth (2012): a z-score index encompassing six measures of
antisemitism in the 1920s and 30s.23 There is virtually zero (or even a negative) correlation be-
23. This index included measures for: pogroms in the 1920s, the share of DVFP votes 1924, the share of NSDAP votes
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tween these expressions of early 20th-century antisemitism and AfD support, both in 2013 and in
2016/17. Finally, in column 5 we use the indicator variable for the occurrence of pogroms in the
wake of the Black Death of 1348 (again, collected by Voigtländer and Voth (2012)). If anything, the
correlation between medieval Jewish hatred —which has been shown to be a consistent predictor
Nazi support — and AfD support is negative.
These findings suggest that what persisted between the Weimar era and today, and determines
the AfD’s electoral succes, is not antisemitism but rather a right-wing ideology. In fact, the AfD
was successful at keeping antisemitism out of its official policy platforms and actually explicitly
endorsing Israel;24 its religious animus is clearly more directed against Islam. Rather, the common
ground between the NSDAP and the AfD in its post-2015 incarnation is nationalism and a closure
towards all things foreign, especially as a reaction to economic distress.
5.3 Robustness checks
The results presented so far were simple bivariate correlations, conditional only on state fixed
effects. In the following, we examine the robustness to the inclusion of plausible determinants of
electoral behavior: both historical (variables that may explain the predominance of NSDAP voters
in the 1920s and 30s) and contemporary (present-day sociodemographics as correlates of electoral
outcomes). In Table 4, we examine how our preferred specification of Table 2, Panel C, using the
change in AfD votes from 2013 to 2016/17 as the dependent variable, is sensitive to the inclusion
of these covariates. Column 1 of Table 4 first presents the baseline estimate (without controls) as a
benchmark.
In the following columns, we add control variables related to population, religion, and em-
ployment structures. In Panel A, we only include the controls relating to the Weimar era. In
Panel B, we only include the controls relating to the present day. Finally, in Panel C we repeat
each regression including both historical and contemporary controls. Starting in column 2, we
consider the domain of “population”: we control either for the (log) size of the municipality in
the 1920s/30s, or for the current (log) size of the municipality and for an urbanization category
dummy, or for all of these variables together. In neither case is the baseline estimate modified
substantially.
When we consider the domain of “religion”, in column 3, we control for the population shares
of Catholics and Jews in 1925 in Panel A (the omitted category is Protestants and “others”, the
latter being negligible in 1925), and for the population shares of Catholics and “others” (includ-
ing Muslims, other religions, and atheists) in Panel B (the omitted category is Protestants). The
inclusion of this set of controls, no matter whether contemporary or historical, changes the mag-
1928, letters to the Stürmer (an antisemitic newspaper), deportations per 100 Jews in 1933, and an indicator variable for
whether a synagogue was destroyed (or damaged).
24. At the same time, however, several elected officials of the AfD (especially in Baden-Württemberg’s state legisla-
ture) have expressed antisemitic attitudes.
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nitude (but not the precision) of the estimated coefficients quite substantially: the estimated beta
coefficients drops by about half from 0.15 to 0.06–0.07. The crucial explanatory factor here is
the presence of Catholics: as pointed out by a large literature, most recently by Spenkuch and
Tillmann (2017), Catholic regions were, ceteris paribus, less likely to vote for the NSDAP. Our
analysis shows that this holds also for today’s support for the AfD, even in a within-state setting.
Nevertheless, albeit dampened the correlation between Nazi support and AfD electorate today
remains quite substantial and highly significant.
Column 4 considers another major determinant of voting behavior: the economic/social struc-
ture, and the economic conditions (especially distress caused by unemployment). In Panel A, we
control for the historical employment structure in municipalities or counties: shares of employed
in industry/manufacturing, in commerce, and in administration (agriculture and other sectors
being the omitted category). We also control for unemployment rates in 1933, at the peak of the
Great Depression in Germany. In Panel B, we control for the official, municipal-level unemploy-
ment rate in 2015. Across all panels, including controls for the employment structure does not
affect the baseline correlation between historical Nazi support and contemporary votes for the
AfD (if anything, the correlation becomes stronger).
Finally, column 5 pools all control variables from columns 2–4 together. Even in this most
demanding specification, the correlation between NSDAP support and support for the AfD re-
mains strong and significant: the estimated beta coefficient in Panel C, when both historical and
contemporary controls are included, is approximately 0.07.
Table 5 looks more closely at the spatial heterogeneity of results, and at current determinants
of voting that may explain the shift towards the AfD from 2013 to 2016/17. After reproducing the
baseline estimate again in column 1, in column 2 we investigate whether the effect of historical
NSDAP voting differs between states East and West Germany. Radical right movements (espe-
cially neo-Nazis) and xenophobia have long been a problem in the states of formerly communist
East Germany. However, even if generally support for the AfD (post-2015) is higher in the East (in
our sample of elections, 10.7% in the West and 24.0% in the East), the pattern of historical persis-
tence is nearly identical. The two coefficients suggest a standardized correlation ranging between
0.11 in the East and 0.15 in the West; a test of equality of coefficients yields a p-value of 0.78.
Arguably the most important political event in Germany in 2015 was the sudden and dramatic
influx of refugees, mostly fleeing the Syrian civil war. Large numbers of them — hundreds of
thousands — reached Germany on foot, via the Balkans and Austria, after Germany’s decision,
in September 2015, to suspend the Dublin agreement and not to limit their intake. The refugees
were allocated to states and counties according to their size and GDP; however, within counties,
the allocation of refugees to municipalities had idiosyncratic reasons. The effect of the refugee
inflow on votes for the far right is ambiguous. On the one hand, refugees are often perceived
as a threat and a potential source of crime, moving voters to the right (Dustmann, Vasiljeva, and
Piil Damm, 2016); on the other hand, in line with Allport’s (1954) “contact hypotheses”, direct
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acquaintance with the fate of refugees can actually increase empathy and support for moderate
parties (Steinmayr, 2017).
In column 3, we control for the presence of refugees in each municipality (calculated as a share
relative to total population, as of late 2016). The effect is negative, suggesting that more refugees
lead to fewer votes for the AfD, and negligible: the standard deviation of the “share refugees”
variable is 0.004. Increasing the share of refugees by one standard deviation thus decreases the
vote share of the AfD by less than half a percentage point of a standard deviation.
Globalization, the decline of manufacturing, and the increase in job insecurity are often cited as
a cause of the far right’s electoral fortunes. Overall, Germany had a comparatively strong economy
in the time frame considered (2013 to 2016/17), and among developed countries it remains among
those with the highest shares of employment in (skilled) manufacturing, and the lowest rates of
unemployment, also among youths. In fact, across the municipalities in our dataset, between 2013
and 2016 the number of unemployed individuals decreased by 7 percent on average. In column 4,
we control for the change in unemployment: as predicted, an increase in unemployment leads
to a larger change in the AfD’s vote share between 2013 and 2016/17. However, the effect is
comparatively small and leaves the main coefficient of interest virtually unaffected. Including
both the controls for refugee presence and for unemployment (column 5) also does not affect the
historical persistence of NSDAP voting; when all controls, historical and contemporary, of Table 4
are additionally included, the results are still stable (column 6).
5.4 Voter migration
Recall that, in all regressions shown so far, the dependent variable was defined as the share of
votes cast for the AfD relative to the eligible voting population: the goal was to encompass both
margins of voter mobilization towards a party moving to the far right. In what follows, we want
to understand the importance of the intensive margin (voters moving from other parties to the
AfD) and the extensive margin (voter mobilization from non-voting to voting).
We begin with the analysis of turnout. Table 6, column 1, present regressions in which the
dependent variable is the voter turnout in the elections of 2013 and 2016/17 (in Panels A and B,
respectively), and the change in voter turnout between 2013 and 2016/17 (Panel C). Higher Nazi
support in the 1920s and 30s is associated with moderately lower turnout in 2013: a one standard
deviation higher NSDAP support translates into half a percentage point lower turnout, relative
to a sample mean of almost 64 percent. In 2016, the association turns positive, but is small and
insignificant. More interestingly, between 2013 and 2016/17 voter turnout increased by 3.6 per-
centage points overall, and this increase is substantially and significantly correlated with historical
Nazi vote: a one standard deviation higher NSDAP support is associated with a 0.7 percentage
points larger increase in turnout.
Having established that the mobilization of non-voters is strongly associated with historical
Nazi support, we now look at the intensive margin: conditional on voting, which parties are
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chosen? We first, in column 2, look at the AfD. As opposed to the previous tables, we now use the
(unstandardized) AfD vote share relative to votes cast as the dependent variable, rather than relative
to eligible voters. The picture, however, is similar. There is a small and insignificant correlation of
historical Nazi support with AfD votes in 2013, and a positive, strong and significant correlation
with AfD votes in 2016, and with the change in votes cast for the AfD.
In columns 3 and 4 we consider the two largest parties in Germany, the moderately conserva-
tive CDU and the social democratic SPD. The associations of historical Nazi support with votes
for these two parties are each other’s mirror image: CDU voters are, on average, located where
historically the NSDAP was less represented, whereas SPD voters are more likely to be located in
NSDAP strongholds. This historical association can plausibly be explained by sociodemographic
characteristics (urban vs. rural, presence of Catholics); importantly, however, the comparison of
Panels A and B (or, the results in Panel C) shows that this correlation does not change over time,
even as the electoral fortunes of these two parties vary.
Instead, the results of the far-right NPD are consistently positively correlated with the NSDAP
vote (column 5). The implied beta coefficient is approximately 0.1, thus slightly lower than the
correlation with the AfD vote in 2016/17. Looking at Panel C, one can see that higher Nazi vote
shares in the past are associated with a move away from the NPD between 2013 and 2016/17,
suggesting that this is a potential electoral basin the AfD drew from — albeit one should obvi-
ously be cautious with inferences on individual voter migration made based on aggregate data. A
similar picture emerges for the “Linke” party, the far-left option in the German political spectrum
(column 6). In 2013, there is a positive correlation between historical Nazi vote and contemporary
Linke vote shares; this correlation all but disappears by 2016/17. As was the case for the NPD, the
change in votes going to the Linke is negatively associated with historical Nazi support.
Again, one should caution against drawing conclusions on individual voter migration based
on aggregate data. The historical correlations in Table 6 are, however, at least consistent with a
world in which the electoral success of the AfD post-2015 draws from two sources: from mobiliz-
ing former non-voters, and from former voters of other extreme parties, both on the far left and
the far right end of the political spectrum.25
6 Conclusion
We have argued that a hitherto unexplored historical persistence of right-wing ideology is a de-
terminant of electoral outcomes in Germany. As an existing party, the Alternative for Germany,
moved to the right end of the political spectrum and espoused a nationalist, xenophobic platform,
a historical pattern emerged: municipalities that (conditional on state fixed effects and several
other covariates) supported the NSDAP during the Weimar republic voted proportionally more




This is a preliminary progress report. The upcoming federal election of September 24 will
allow us to test this hypothesis on the universe of municipalities in Germany. Moreover, in future
work we plan to analyse the persistence of right-wing attitudes as expressed in opinion surveys.
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Notes: The four graphs report the perceived location of the AfD on the left-right political spectrum, as derived from
answers to the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES).
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Notes: The graph shows the frequency of Facebook posts containing one of four, selected word stems/families. 90-day
moving averages displayed.
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Notes: The graph shows the empirical distribution of estimated difference-in-difference coefficients, resulting from the
empirical setup in equation (2), relating to 645 frequent word stems on Facebook, together with the location of six
selected word stems.
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Notes: The map shows the 16 federal states in Germany, including three city states. Six states held the elections to
their regional parliaments between March 2015 and September 2017 and are thus included in our empirical analyses:
Baden-Württemberg (BW), Rhineland-Palatinate (RP), Saxony-Anhalt (ST), Mecklenburg-Anterior Pomerania (MV),
Schleswig-Holstein (SH), and North Rhine-Westphalia (NW). The Saarland (SL) also held its regional elections in 2017;
however, we disregard the Saarland as, during the Weimar era, it was occupied by French troops and no elections to
the Reichstag were held. We also do not consider the city states of Berlin (BE), Bremen (HB), and Hamburg (HH).
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Notes: The graph shows the relationship between historical Nazi vote share and the change in votes for the AfD between
2013 and 2016/17 as a binned scatterplot.
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TABLE 1: AFD’S LANGUAGE CHANGE: DIFF-IN-DIFF ESTIMATES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Greece Euro Islam Migration Nation
PANEL A: Mentions per 100 words in manifestos
AfD × After March 2015 -0.011 -0.780∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ -0.041
(0.021) (0.193) (0.013) (0.050) (0.237)
PANEL B: Mentions per 100 words in speeches
AfD × After March 2015 -0.183∗∗ -0.546∗∗∗ 0.063∗ -0.028 0.112
(0.070) (0.099) (0.034) (0.097) (0.100)
PANEL C: Mentioned in Twitter posts
AfD × After March 2015 -0.059∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.023∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.018)
PANEL D: Mentioned in Facebook posts
AfD × After March 2015 -0.017 -0.055∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.021) (0.011) (0.023) (0.030)
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors (in brackets) from OLS regressions. In panel A the unit of
observation is a manifesto, in panel B a speech, in panel C a Twitter post and in panel D a Facebook
post. All regressions include party (AFD, CDU, CSU, FDP, Grüne, Die Linke, NPD, SPD) fixed effects.
Panels A and B include year fixed effects, panels C and D month fixed effects. Number of observations:
70 (panel A), 113 (panel B), 66,422 (panel C) and 40,118 (panel D). One, two and three stars represent
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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TABLE 2: AFD ELECTORAL RESULTS









PANEL A: AfD vote share 2013
0.0523 0.0129 0.0832∗ 0.0408
(0.0443) (0.0315) (0.0472) (0.0414)
PANEL B: AfD vote share 2016/17
0.1606∗∗∗ 0.0943∗∗∗ 0.1765∗∗∗ 0.1226∗∗∗
(0.0372) (0.0280) (0.0387) (0.0353)
PANEL C: Change in AfD vote share 2013 to 2016/17
0.1510∗∗∗ 0.0945∗∗∗ 0.1574∗∗∗ 0.1149∗∗∗
(0.0318) (0.0256) (0.0309) (0.0301)
State FEs X X X X
Observations 5861 5861 5861 5861
Notes: The column header indicates the respective explanatory variable used,
the panel header the respective dependent variable. The explanatory vari-
able in column (1) is the standardized average of NSDAP vote shares in
1928, 1930, and 1933. All variables (explanatory and dependent) are stan-
dardized. Sample includes municipalities in the six German states of Baden-
Württemberg, Mecklenburg-Anterior Pomerania, North Rhine-Westphalia,
Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony-Anhalt and Schleswig-Holstein. All regressions
include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of historic
municipalities/counties. One, two and three stars represent significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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TABLE 3: AFD ELECTORAL RESULTS: PERSISTENCE OF ANTISEMITISM











PANEL A: AfD vote share 2013
0.0559 0.0140 0.0401 -0.0510∗∗ -0.0982
(0.0473) (0.0290) (0.0369) (0.0246) (0.0609)
PANEL B: AfD vote share 2016
0.2392∗∗∗ 0.0119 0.1135∗∗∗ -0.0178 -0.1264∗∗
(0.0433) (0.0350) (0.0327) (0.0247) (0.0495)
PANEL C: Change in AfD vote share 2013 to 2016
0.2322∗∗∗ 0.0078 0.1057∗∗∗ -0.0018 -0.0999∗∗
(0.0373) (0.0331) (0.0313) (0.0244) (0.0500)
State FEs X X X X X
Observations 5860 5860 423 423 423
Notes: The column header indicates the respective explanatory variable used, the panel
header the respective dependent variable. The explanatory variable in column (4) is the
standardized first principal component of six measures of 1920s/30s antisemitism, as in
Voigtländer and Voth (2012). All variables (explanatory and dependent) are standardized,
except the indicator variable for Black Death Pogroms in column (5), which has a mean
of 0.251. Sample includes municipalities in the six German states of Baden-Württemberg,
Mecklenburg-Anterior Pomerania, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony-
Anhalt and Schleswig-Holstein. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the level of historic municipalities/counties. One, two and three stars repre-
sent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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TABLE 4: AFD ELECTORAL RESULTS INCLUDING CONTROLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Population Religion Employment Full
PANEL A: With historical controls
Standardized NSDAP Share 0.1510∗∗∗ 0.1550∗∗∗ 0.0652∗∗ 0.1753∗∗∗ 0.0903∗∗
(0.0318) (0.0326) (0.0285) (0.0342) (0.0364)
Observations 5861 5797 5407 4520 4359
PANEL B: With contemporary controls
Standardized NSDAP Share 0.1510∗∗∗ 0.1512∗∗∗ 0.0705∗∗∗ 0.1418∗∗∗ 0.0654∗∗
(0.0318) (0.0317) (0.0268) (0.0307) (0.0264)
Observations 5861 5861 5088 5827 5057
PANEL C: With historical and contemporary controls
Standardized NSDAP Share 0.1510∗∗∗ 0.1554∗∗∗ 0.0575∗∗ 0.1646∗∗∗ 0.0714∗∗
(0.0318) (0.0323) (0.0280) (0.0346) (0.0352)
State FEs X X X X X
Observations 5861 5797 4998 4487 4008
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in vote share for the AfD (relative to eligible voters) from 2013 to
2016/17. Each column adds a different set of historical control variables. The explanatory variable across all
columns is the average NSDAP vote share across 1928, 1930, and 1933 (standardized). Population controls are:
[historical] log population size (average of 1925 and 1933); [contemporary] log population size in 2015 and urban-
ization code dummies (3 categories). Religion controls are: [historical] the share of Catholics and Jews; [contem-
porary] the share of Catholics and “Others” (i.e., Muslims, other religions, and no religion). Employment controls
are: [historical] shares of employed in industry and manufacturing, employed in trade and commerce, and em-
ployed in administration (agriculture and “other sectors” is the omitted category), all measured in 1925, as well
as the unemployment share in 1933; [contemporary] the unemployment rate in 2015. Sample includes municipali-
ties in the six German states of Baden-Württemberg, Mecklenburg-Anterior Pomerania, North Rhine-Westphalia,
Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony-Anhalt and Schleswig-Holstein. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the level of historic municipalities/counties. One, two and three stars represent significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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TABLE 5: AFD ELECTORAL RESULTS: LOCAL ECONOMIC SHOCKS







Standardized NSDAP Share 0.1510∗∗∗ 0.1508∗∗∗ 0.1439∗∗∗ 0.1436∗∗∗ 0.0665∗
(0.0318) (0.0318) (0.0306) (0.0307) (0.0350)
Std. NSDAP Share × East 0.1144
(0.1331)
Std. NSDAP Share ×West 0.1526∗∗∗
(0.0327)
Share refugees -1.1094 -1.4516 -1.2306
(2.4535) (2.4239) (2.9898)
% change unemployed (2013–16) 0.0497∗ 0.0518∗ 0.0880∗∗∗
(0.0293) (0.0291) (0.0337)
State FEs X X X X X X
Historical controls X
Contemporary controls X
Observations 5861 5861 5861 5768 5768 3949
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in vote share for the AfD (relative to eligible voters) from 2013 to 2016/17. NSDAP
share is defined as the standardized average of vote shares in 1928, 1930, and 1933. Sample includes municipalities in the
six German states of Baden-Württemberg, Mecklenburg-Anterior Pomerania, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate,
Saxony-Anhalt and Schleswig-Holstein. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of
historic municipalities/counties. One, two and three stars represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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TABLE 6: PERSISTENCE OF VOTING: TURNOUT AND OTHER PARTIES
Intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Turnout AfD CDU SPD NPD Linke
PANEL A: 2013
Standardized NSDAP Share -0.0053∗∗ 0.0015 -0.0238∗∗∗ 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0010) (0.0069) (0.0047) (0.0005) (0.0011)
Mean dep. var. 0.6385 0.0473 0.4628 0.2410 0.0144 0.0751
PANEL B: 2016
Standardized NSDAP Share 0.0021 0.0090∗∗∗ -0.0212∗∗∗ 0.0120∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0003
(0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0058) (0.0039) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Mean dep. var. 0.6748 0.1291 0.3260 0.2688 0.0112 0.0415
PANEL C: Change 2013 to 2016
Standardized NSDAP Share 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0075∗∗∗ 0.0026 -0.0039 -0.0013∗∗∗ -0.0030∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0004) (0.0008)
Mean dep. var. 0.0363 0.0818 -0.1368 0.0277 -0.0051 -0.0336
State FEs X X X X X X
Observations 5861 5861 5861 5861 4725 5861
Notes: The dependent variable is turnout (total votes cast relative to eligible voters) in column 1; the vote share (relative
to total votes cast) of AfD, CDU, SPD, NPD and Linke, respectively, in columns 2–6. NSDAP share is defined as the
standardized average of vote shares in 1928, 1930, and 1933. Sample includes municipalities in the six German states of
Baden-Württemberg, Mecklenburg-Anterior Pomerania, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony-Anhalt and
Schleswig-Holstein. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of historic munici-
palities/counties. One, two and three stars represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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Supplementary Appendix: Not for Publication
A Data Description
A.1 Matching contemporary and historical election data
We match present-day electoral outcomes to the Weimar era party support in two steps:
Step 1: First, we identify the boundary of each county with electoral data in the Falter and
Hänisch (1990) dataset, using the county name to match counties to polygons in the shapefile
provided by the Census Mosaic project1. We then identify coordinates for each Weimar era mu-
nicipality (to the best of our knowledge, no shapefiles of municipalities in the period are available):
for each municipality, we first use OpenStreetMaps’ Nominatim API to search for modern admin-
istrative centers, villages, towns, cities or suburbs sharing a name with the historic municipality.
We overlay the returned coordinates on the county map and discard any results which lie outside
the boundary of the county to which the historic municipality belongs, according to the Falter and
Hänisch (1990) data. In this way, we obtain valid latitude and longitude coordinates for around
two thirds of the Weimar era municipalities. For municipalities which return no valid matches,
for example because of name changes between the Weimar era and today, we manually search for
coordinates. To do so, we use a combination of sources including gov.genealogy.net, a database of
historic geographies, and Wikipedia. We check the manual lookups for validity by ensuring that
the coordinates lie within the boundaries of the county to which the municipality belongs, again
according to the Falter and Hänisch (1990) data.
Step 2: In this step, we match contemporary municipalities to a Weimar era geography for which
the Falter and Hänisch (1990) dataset provides electoral data. If a modern municaplity’s coor-
dinates (provided by DESTATIS) are within 2.5 kilometers of the coordinates of a municipality
identified in Step 1, we match the contemporary district to the electoral data from that historic
municipality. Otherwise, we overlay the coordinates of the modern municipality on top of the
shapefile of counties and assign the electoral results for the “remainder of the county” to the mod-
ern municipality. Because electoral geography is not constant between 1924 and 1932, a modern
municipality can be matched to different entities for different election years.
1. Electoral geography changes between the years 1924 and 1932, the result of counties being merged or split and
other boundary changes. We thus match counties to boundaries seperately for each of the 1924, 1928, 1930 and 1932
elections. In a very small number of cases, we make changes to the county shapefiles in order to better match the
county/municipality hierarchy provided by the Falter and Hänisch (1990) dataset
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B Additional results: Text Data
FIGURE B.1: AFD ELECTORAL POSTER, 2013
Notes: Electoral poster for the federal election of September 2013. It reads: “Greeks are desperate. Germans are paying.
Banks are cashing in. Stop this.”
FIGURE B.2: AFD ELECTORAL POSTER, 2016
Notes: Electoral poster for the state election in Baden-Württemberg in March 2016. It reads: “For our state – for our
values. Immigration needs clear rules.”
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TABLE B.1: LIST OF POLITICAL MANIFESTOS
Year Manifesto type Party # of words # of pages
2013 Federal election AfD 3923 12
2013 Federal election CDU/CSU 41367 81
2013 Federal election FDP 38040 104
2013 Federal election Grüne 86557 337
2013 Federal election Linke 39011 100
2013 Federal election NPD 3585 52
2013 Federal election SPD 41003 120
2014 European Parliament election AfD 8974 25
2014 European Parliament election CDU/CSU 22020 84
2014 European Parliament election FDP 10778 28
2014 European Parliament election Grüne 22223 57
2014 European Parliament election Linke 12971 76
2014 European Parliament election SPD 6383 14
2014 Party platform AfD 3143 14
2015 Resolution FDP 6520 13
2015 Erfurter Resolution AfD 630 3
2016 State election, Baden-Württemberg AfD 19474 64
2016 State election, Baden-Württemberg CDU/CSU 33658 156
2016 State election, Baden-Württemberg FDP 20213 63
2016 State election, Baden-Württemberg Grüne 50632 249
2016 State election, Baden-Württemberg Linke 25084 44
2016 State election, Baden-Württemberg NPD 6310 26
2016 State election, Baden-Württemberg SPD 25232 41
2016 Guidelines CDU/CSU 18117 47
2016 Guidelines AfD 23846 96
2016 Guidelines AfD 21892 78
2016 State election, Mecklenburg-A. Pomerania AfD 6744 22
2016 State election, Mecklenburg-A. Pomerania CDU/CSU 8464 27
2016 State election, Mecklenburg-A. Pomerania FDP 21439 86
2016 State election, Mecklenburg-A. Pomerania Grüne 21702 28
2016 State election, Mecklenburg-A. Pomerania Linke 22124 54
2016 State election, Mecklenburg-A. Pomerania NPD 2978 7
2016 State election, Mecklenburg-A. Pomerania SPD 17426 48
2016 State election, Rhineland-Palatinate AfD 7784 17
2016 State election, Rhineland-Palatinate CDU/CSU 1815 8
2016 State election, Rhineland-Palatinate FDP 31497 83
2016 State election, Rhineland-Palatinate Grüne 39389 57
2016 State election, Rhineland-Palatinate Linke 18830 57
2016 State election, Rhineland-Palatinate NPD 1506 3
2016 State election, Rhineland-Palatinate SPD 16737 56
2016 State election, Saxony-Anhalt AfD 4867 68
(Continued on next page)
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(Continued from previous page)
Year Manifesto type Party # of words # of pages
2016 State election, Saxony-Anhalt CDU/CSU 19715 64
2016 State election, Saxony-Anhalt FDP 2705 12
2016 State election, Saxony-Anhalt Grüne 27260 76
2016 State election, Saxony-Anhalt Linke 19222 44
2016 State election, Saxony-Anhalt NPD 1750 6
2016 State election, Saxony-Anhalt SPD 19070 53
2017 State election, North Rhine-Westfalia AfD 12091 39
2017 State election, North Rhine-Westfalia CDU/CSU 38115 120
2017 State election, North Rhine-Westfalia FDP 24188 49
2017 State election, North Rhine-Westfalia Grüne 82836 131
2017 State election, North Rhine-Westfalia Linke 44709 132
2017 State election, North Rhine-Westfalia NPD 8182 52
2017 State election, North Rhine-Westfalia SPD 38163 116
2017 State election, Schleswig-Holstein AfD 18053 56
2017 State election, Schleswig-Holstein FDP 28952 117
2017 State election, Schleswig-Holstein Grüne 34612 94
2017 State election, Schleswig-Holstein CDU/CSU 23827 96
2017 State election, Schleswig-Holstein Linke 24669 70
2017 State election, Schleswig-Holstein SPD 21670 66
2017 State election, Saarland AfD 9654 43
2017 State election, Saarland CDU/CSU 25816 72
2017 State election, Saarland FDP 6462 19
2017 State election, Saarland Grüne 23263 70
2017 State election, Saarland Linke 15468 34
2017 State election, Saarland NPD 1895 8
2017 State election, Saarland SPD 19303 52
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TABLE B.2: AFD’S LANGUAGE CHANGE: MEANS OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES (TABLE 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Greece Euro Islam Migration Nation
PANEL A: Mentions per 100 words in manifestos
Mean (overall) 0.005 0.140 0.030 0.264 0.610
Mean (all parties, pre-March 2015) 0.013 0.292 0.013 0.170 1.028
Mean (AfD) 0.015 0.401 0.046 0.405 0.963
Mean (AfD, pre-March 2015) 0.031 1.043 0.000 0.199 1.406
PANEL B: Mentions per 100 words in speeches
Mean (overall) 0.055 0.145 0.033 0.126 0.556
Mean (all parties, pre-March 2015) 0.088 0.235 0.023 0.074 0.498
Mean (AfD) 0.102 0.367 0.028 0.128 0.789
Mean (AfD, pre-March 2015) 0.216 0.703 0.000 0.105 0.697
PANEL C: Mentioned in Twitter posts
Mean (overall) 0.011 0.021 0.010 0.043 0.086
Mean (all parties, pre-March 2015) 0.012 0.027 0.009 0.022 0.089
Mean (AfD) 0.053 0.133 0.009 0.027 0.113
Mean (AfD, pre-March 2015) 0.069 0.175 0.002 0.016 0.133
PANEL D: Mentioned in Facebook posts
Mean (overall) 0.019 0.055 0.024 0.088 0.230
Mean (all parties, pre-March 2015) 0.017 0.059 0.017 0.040 0.200
Mean (AfD) 0.064 0.184 0.044 0.166 0.371
Mean (AfD, pre-March 2015) 0.068 0.214 0.015 0.058 0.231
Notes: Table reports means for five groups of words. These are the dependent variables in the diff-in-
diff regressions of Table 1. Overall means (first row in each panel) and conditional means reported.
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TABLE B.3: MOST FREQUENT WORDS (STEMS IN TABLE 1)
Greece Euro Islam Migration Nation
griechenland euro islamischen zuwanderung deutschlands
griechische eurokrise muslime flüchtlingen deutsche
griechischen euroraum islam asyl deutscher
griechen ezb islamistische migration deutsch
griechenlands eurostaaten islamistischen einwanderung nationale
grieche eurozone islamische flüchtlingspolitik national
griechisch eurorettung islamisten asylverfahren nationalen
griechenlandanleihen euros islamischer zuwanderer deutschen
griechischer eurobonds muslimen asylsuchende deutsches
griechenlandkrise eurojust muslimischen einwanderer nationaler
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